Strong convergence conjecture for imitation dynamics
Strong convergence conjecture for imitation dynamics
Let be a game matrix and let be a learning rate. Let denote the relevant maximal-set quantity in the imitation dynamics, and let be a learning-rate bound. Strong convergence conjecture. For every game matrix , there exists a learning rate such that the imitation dynamics always converge when . The source presents this as the second of two general convergence conjectures and leaves it as an open problem; no proof or resolution is given.
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Primary source
Christopher Griffin, Sarah Rajtmajer, Anna Squicciarini and Andrew Belmonte, “Consensus and Information Cascades in Game-Theoretic Imitation Dynamics with Static and Dynamic Network Topologies”, arXiv:1903.11429 (2019).
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