Strong convergence conjecture for imitation dynamics

From papers

Let A\mathbf{A} be a game matrix and let α\alpha be a learning rate. Let IG(t)I_G(t) denote the relevant maximal-set quantity in the imitation dynamics, and let α\alpha^* be a learning-rate bound. Strong convergence conjecture. For every game matrix A\mathbf{A}, there exists a learning rate α\alpha^* such that the imitation dynamics always converge when αα\alpha\leq\alpha^*. The source presents this as the second of two general convergence conjectures and leaves it as an open problem; no proof or resolution is given.

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Sources & referencesView supporting material

Primary source

Christopher Griffin, Sarah Rajtmajer, Anna Squicciarini and Andrew Belmonte, “Consensus and Information Cascades in Game-Theoretic Imitation Dynamics with Static and Dynamic Network Topologies”, arXiv:1903.11429 (2019).

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