20 problems

Unconditional logarithmic rent conjecture. The bound continues to hold when (L2)--(L4) are dropped: when the excitation is endogenous to the designer's policy, agents learn from th…

Let $\mu$ and $d$ satisfy … Let $\mathcal{P}(\mu,d)$ be the ambiguity set of non-negative distributions with mean $\mu$ and mean absolute deviation $d$. The minimax problem conside…

Let $\boldsymbol{F}=\{F_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ be $n\geq1$ asymmetric quasi-regular valuation distributions, let $\varepsilon\in(0,1)$, and define truncated distributions…

Let asymmetric regular and quasi-regular buyers be compared using the revenue approximation of Bayesian Optimal Uniform Pricing to Bayesian Optimal Mechanism, with tight ratio deno…

Let asymmetric regular and quasi-regular buyers be given valuation samples, and let the Empirical Myerson Auction be the auction learned from those samples to approximate Bayesian…

Let asymmetric and symmetric buyers have quasi-regular valuation distributions, and let $\calC_{{\sf BOM}}^{\textsf{Bayesian Optimal Uniform Reserve}}$ denote the revenue approxima…

Let asymmetric regular or quasi-regular buyers be evaluated by the revenue ratio of Bayesian Optimal Uniform Pricing to the Bayesian Optimal Mechanism, denoted by…

Logarithmic finite-horizon separation conjecture. The correct asymptotic rate of this gap is $\ln T/T$, which would imply a separation between the infinite-horizon and finite-horiz…

Dynamic MEV sharing uses a feedback-controlled redistribution mechanism in which the redistributed amount is governed by the MEV dynamics rather than solely by observed MEV. MEV-sm…

Giannakopoulos–Koutsoupias conjecture. The straight-jacket auction is optimal for this auction problem.

Let $a(\omega)$ be an optimal policy with support $\Xi$, and define … The conditions in Proposition 1.4 are that, when $\Xi$ is $X$-maximal for some set $X$ and $\Xi\subseteq X$, o…

Let $G=a-g(\omega)$ and let $W(a,\omega)=W(a)$ have the unique tangent hyperplane property: tangent hyperplanes to the graph of $W$ at any two distinct points $a_1\ne a_2$ are dist…

General uniqueness conjecture. $\Sigma^*$ is the unique equilibrium for fewer bidders under a non-informative information structure, regardless of the specific parameters of the au…

Uniqueness conjecture. Fewer bidders are required for $\Sigma^*$ to be the unique equilibrium when the information structure is non-informative than when it is informative.

Generic uniqueness conjecture. The conditions in the uniqueness proposition hold generically, and hence the optimal policy is unique for generic $W$.

The paper considers lane-changing interactions modeled as transferable-utility (TU) games, in which vehicles exchange right-of-way for monetary side payments and report their value…

Let $G$ be a directed graph, let $H_i$ denote the subgraph induced by the vertices owned by player $i$, and let $p_1,\ldots,p_k$ be the players' vertex-ownership probabilities. Let…

The mechanism has a market-clearing price determined by the agents' bids, and agents may anticipate how their individual bids affect that price rather than behaving as price takers…

Price restart discounts are applied to previous clock-phase closing prices to determine the opening prices of a new clock phase, allowing users to adjust their demands in response…

Quadratic voting (QV) is used for binary collective decision problems in the symmetric private-information environment considered here. Quadratic voting efficiency conjecture. QV s…