RSA small-private-exponent problem
RSA small-private-exponent problem
Determine the supremum of the exponents for which the following holds: for every fixed , there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given a balanced RSA public key with for primes and of comparable size, , and private exponent satisfying and , recovers or factors .
Progress summary
A 2026 preprint claims a new unconditional attack on RSA with unusually small private keys, but the result has not yet been independently verified.
The problem asks how far RSA can remain vulnerable when its private exponent is small. A 2026 unrefereed preprint claims an unconditional recovery result reaching , beyond the previous provable boundary.
Known results
- Wiener’s continued-fraction attack recovers the private exponent below roughly .
- Boneh–Durfee’s lattice-based bound reaches approximately , but depends on a heuristic assumption rather than an unconditional proof.
- Practical lattice attacks reported in 2023 reach about to for tested moduli.
2026 claimed improvement
The ePrint paper Provable Recovery of RSA Private Exponents below claims an unconditional theorem for the unrestricted small-private-exponent problem. The scan found no independent exposition, referee report, counterexample, or withdrawal, so the claimed resolution remains unverified.
Current status (as of August 2026): The result is claimed in an unrefereed preprint, while the claim remains unverified and the true general boundary is open.
Sources & referencesView supporting material
Primary source
Additional references
- Provable Recovery of RSA Private Exponents below N^(11/42−ε) — IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
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