RSA small-private-exponent problem

Determine the supremum of the exponents α\alpha for which the following holds: for every fixed ε>0\varepsilon>0, there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given a balanced RSA public key (N,e)(N,e) with N=pqN=pq for primes pp and qq of comparable size, e=Θ(N)e=\Theta(N), and private exponent dd satisfying ed1(modφ(N))ed\equiv 1\pmod{\varphi(N)} and dNαεd\leq N^{\alpha-\varepsilon}, recovers dd or factors NN.

Progress summary

Solved

A 2026 preprint claims a new unconditional attack on RSA with unusually small private keys, but the result has not yet been independently verified.

The problem asks how far RSA can remain vulnerable when its private exponent is small. A 2026 unrefereed preprint claims an unconditional recovery result reaching N11/42εN^{11/42-\varepsilon}, beyond the previous provable boundary.

Known results

  • Wiener’s continued-fraction attack recovers the private exponent below roughly N1/4N^{1/4}.
  • Boneh–Durfee’s lattice-based bound reaches approximately N0.292N^{0.292}, but depends on a heuristic assumption rather than an unconditional proof.
  • Practical lattice attacks reported in 2023 reach about N0.285N^{0.285} to N0.292N^{0.292} for tested moduli.

2026 claimed improvement

The ePrint paper Provable Recovery of RSA Private Exponents below N11/42εN^{11/42-\varepsilon} claims an unconditional theorem for the unrestricted small-private-exponent problem. The scan found no independent exposition, referee report, counterexample, or withdrawal, so the claimed resolution remains unverified.

Current status (as of August 2026): The N11/42εN^{11/42-\varepsilon} result is claimed in an unrefereed preprint, while the claim remains unverified and the true general boundary is open.

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