Non-empty core conjecture for correlated gift exchange coalitions
Let be the set of players and let be a coalition structure, with core stability meaning that no subset can deviate to form a new coalition and make all members of strictly better off. Assume standard gift exchange rules and correlated valuations. Non-empty core conjecture. The coalition formation game has a non-empty core. In particular, family-sized coalitions with among players with correlated preferences are stable. The claim concerns the stability of coalition formation under correlated preferences; the supplied text does not state whether it has been proved or identify conditions beyond standard gift exchange rules.
References
- Daniel Quigley, “Formal specification and behavioral simulation of the holiday gift exchange game”, arXiv:2604.05219 (2026).
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