Payoff imbalance in Nash equilibria of the imbalanced (m,2k+1)(m,2k+1)-RPS game

Consider the given imbalanced (m,2k+1)(m,2k+1)-RPS game and a Nash equilibrium NN. Let Pi(S)P_i(S) be the probability that player ii plays SS, and let Pi(Tp)P_i(T_p) be the probability that player ii plays any PP-type object. Imbalance conjecture. For every player ii,

Pi(Tp)Pi(S)≥m−1.\frac{P_i(T_p)}{P_i(S)}\geq m-1.

Moreover, for any k>1k>1 and player qiq_i, the expected number of other players tying with qiq_i for the win occurring for PkP_k is less than m−2m-2. The conjecture is intended to support a proof that the constructed imbalanced (m,2k+1)(m,2k+1)-RPS game is strongly playable; the source offers only a heuristic based on the rapidly decreasing probability of playing SS in the symmetric three-object Nash equilibrium.

References

Primary source

Itai Maimon, “Different Forms of Imbalance in Strongly Playable Discrete Games II: Multi-Player RPS Games”, arXiv:2511.13736 (2025).

Progress summary

Refreshed
Open

No proof or counterexample has been reported; the conjecture has only heuristic support and yields a conditional result for the associated game.

The conjecture asserts that every player uses PP-type objects at least m−1m-1 times as often as SS, together with a related tie bound when k>1k>1. No proposer or original date is identified in the available record.

Known results

The November 2025 preprint records the conjecture as Conjecture 4.1 and offers only the heuristic that the equilibrium probability of SS decreases rapidly as the number of players grows. Its Theorem 4.2 proves playability, and strong playability for fewer than 5050 players, only assuming the conjecture; it does not prove the conjecture. No proof, counterexample, independent verification, or retraction is reported.

Current status (as of September 2026): The imbalance conjecture remains open; the associated strong-playability claim is conditional on it.

Sources

Solutions 0

No solutions have been posted yet.