Semicontinuity conjecture for Nash equilibrium types in generic two-action games
Semicontinuity conjecture for Nash equilibrium types in generic two-action games
Let be a generic two-action game, with players, Nash equilibrium set , and denoting the set of points of -type. For each , one has
Semicontinuity conjecture. The displayed inequality holds for every generic two-action game and every .
This strengthens the bounds known for product two-action games and for generic two-action games sufficiently close to product games. It is motivated by the observation that, under larger deformations, the -type of a Nash equilibrium may change; the conjecture asserts that the cumulative numbers of equilibria of each type nevertheless satisfy the product-game bounds.
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Sources & referencesView supporting material
Primary source
Claus Hertling and Matija Vujic, “Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies”, arXiv:2412.17890 (2024).
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