← All problems

Nash equilibrium conjecture for the GM-strategies in exact slow NIM

3 years old · traced to

Let xx be a position in the exact slow game NIM⁡(n,n−1)\operatorname{NIM}(n,n-1) played by ℓ\ell players in a fixed cyclic order. A move reduces n−1n-1 positive entries by 11 and leaves one entry unchanged; terminal positions have at least two non-positive entries. The GM-rule assigns a strategy to each player, including the rule that when no entry of xx is a multiple of ℓ\ell, the largest entry is kept unchanged and the other n−1n-1 entries are reduced by 11. Nash equilibrium conjecture. The set of ℓ\ell GM-strategies form a uniform Nash equilibrium. The claim concerns the strategic behavior of the exact slow NIM game with multiple players and asserts that the GM-strategies are jointly stable under unilateral deviation. The supplied text does not state whether this has been proved or remains open.

References
  1. Vladimir Gurvich and Mariya Naumova, “Screw discrete dynamical systems and their applications to exact slow NIM”, arXiv:2312.08382 (2023).

Progress summary

Refreshed
Open · progress reported

A reader-submitted construction claims the conjecture is false in games with at least three piles and players, but the claim has not been independently verified.

Gurvich and Naumova posed the conjecture in 2023 for the exact slow game NIM⁡(n,n−1)\operatorname{NIM}(n,n-1) with ℓ\ell players. They noted that the two-player case follows from earlier results, but gave no proof for general ℓ\ell.

Known results

  • The ℓ=2\ell=2 case follows from earlier results, as noted by Gurvich and Naumova (2023).

Community submission (unverified), November 7, 2026

A submitted proof argues that for every n≥3n\ge3 and ℓ≥3\ell\ge3, an explicit positive position defeats all-GM play for the first player, whereas changing that player’s first move produces a win. It claims an ordinary block-invariant proof, with a finite witness at (n,ℓ,x)=(4,4,5)(n,\ell,x)=(4,4,5), and says the ℓ=2\ell=2 theorem is unaffected.

Current status (as of November 2026): The ℓ=2\ell=2 case is known, while the claimed refutation for n≥3n\ge3 and ℓ≥3\ell\ge3 remains unverified.

Sources

Solutions 1

This record duplicates MathDB 360653. The linked counterexample refutes the uniform Nash-equilibrium claim for every n >= 3 and l >= 3 under the source's game and monetary payoff.See full solutionHide full solution

This is the same conjecture as MathDB 360653; it is covered by the same paper, not a separate result.

For every n >= 3 piles and l >= 3 players, the paper constructs a positive initial position where all-GM play makes the first player lose but changing only that player's first move makes that player win. The proof uses the source's monetary payoff and a block invariant giving the exact play lengths. The infinite family is an ordinary proof; the Lean endpoint certifies a finite witness. This same conjecture also appears as MathDB 361128. The two-player theorem is not contradicted.

Result and scope: Conjecture 1 fails for every n >= 3 and l >= 3 (ordinary block-invariant proof; Lean certifies (4,4,5)); a computed certificate at (5,5,6) shows no completion of the no-multiple convention rescues it; l = 2 is the GMMV23 theorem

Complete proof and verification sources: GM strategies are not a Nash equilibrium in l-player exact slow NIM(n, n-1) for n, l >= 3: a refutation of Gurvich-Naumova Conjecture 1 (arXiv:2311.03257) · PDF.

The paper page includes the supplementary proof-source JSON attachment and extract_sources.py, which reconstruct the archived proof and verification sources. The linked paper gives the complete rigorous argument and specifies exactly which statements are formalized.

This is an AI-assisted research preprint. Internal review is not external journal peer review; bounded prior-art searches do not certify worldwide priority. See the paper for the source, interpretation, formalization, and trust limitations.