The isomorphism conjecture for true unprovable sentences

Let S\mathcal{S} and T\mathcal{T} be consistent theories, with T\mathcal{T} strictly stronger than S\mathcal{S}, and let I\mathfrak{I} be a collection of sentences unprovable in T\mathcal{T}. For ϕI\phi\in\mathfrak{I}, write Tϕ\mathcal{T}\nvdash\phi when T\mathcal{T} does not prove ϕ\phi, and interpret the displayed bounds as bounds on proof lengths. Isomorphism conjecture. The conjecture holds when I\mathfrak{I} consists of any true sentences ϕ\phi unprovable in T\mathcal{T}: if S\mathcal{S} cannot prove that T\mathcal{T} cannot prove ϕ\phi, then S\mathcal{S} cannot do so with a proof of length tO(1)t^{\mathcal{O}(1)} when the asserted absence concerns proofs of length at most tt. The conjecture is false if I\mathfrak{I} includes all unprovable sentences, because false unprovable sentences can provide counterexamples; its restriction to true sentences is proposed as an open possibility.

Sources & referencesView supporting material

Primary source

Hunter Monroe, “Hardness of Ruling Out Short Proofs of Kolmogorov Randomness”, arXiv:2301.04789 (2023).

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