Borda count is Stablest Conjecture
Borda count is Stablest Conjecture
Let be the set of rankings of candidates, and let be a ranked-choice voting method, where is the simplex of randomized outcomes on the candidates. For each coordinate function , voter has influence ; the method is balanced when , and it satisfies the Condorcet Loser Criterion when a candidate who loses pairwise to every other candidate cannot be selected. Let denote noise stability under independent ranking corruption, and let be the Borda count method. Borda count is Stablest Conjecture. For any , , and , there exists such that, for all , if for every voter and candidate , if is balanced, and if satisfies the Condorcet Loser Criterion, then
This is the paper's formal ranked-choice analogue of Plurality is Stablest. The source does not report a resolution, so it remains open.
Sources & referencesView supporting material
Primary source
Steven Heilman, “Noise Stability of Ranked Choice Voting”, arXiv:2209.11183 (2022).
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